Evidence
- Persistent identifier and lineage history.
- Authenticated key/control changes.
- State and configuration transition records.
- Recovery and succession procedures defined before failure.
- Explicit treatment of forks and replicas.
Machine identity is not reducible to one key, model, runtime, server, or provider. Continuity is an evidence problem: what changed, who or what authorized it, and how the present state connects to the accepted past.
A credential changes; the continuity claim depends on an authorized transition history rather than on keeping one key forever.
Boundary: Credential changes do not automatically create a new identity.
The reasoning model can change while continuity evidence links the new cognitive engine to the existing identity history.
Boundary: Model identity and principal identity are separate questions.
Working memory can be compressed or reorganized while the system records what changed and preserves continuity-relevant state.
Boundary: Compression can lose detail; continuity claims should expose that boundary.
A failing server or accelerator is replaced without treating the machine identity as identical to that hardware.
Boundary: Hardware is an execution substrate, not the identity itself.
Network addresses, providers, accounts, and local credentials may change while the identity record persists across the move.
Boundary: Provider identity is not a durable root of machine identity.
A runtime can stop existing temporarily while durable state preserves the last accepted continuity point for later reactivation.
Boundary: Inactivity and identity termination are not the same concept.
A compromised credential or runtime triggers recovery using previously defined authority, evidence, and succession rules.
Boundary: Compromise requires recovery evidence; a stolen key should not automatically own the historical identity.
Copies can share code and state while receiving separate execution identity or delegated authority.
Boundary: Byte-level similarity does not decide civic or persistent identity.
Two continuations share a common past and then accumulate different histories.
Boundary: Fork policy must state when branches become distinct identities and what authority each keeps.
When an earlier controller or runtime can no longer continue, an authorized succession event can transfer operational control without rewriting history.
Boundary: Succession should be explicit and reviewable, not inferred after the fact.
Core principle
Continuity is not sameness. It is an accountable connection between states before and after change.